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Abstract 
This note estimates the tax incidence of a proposed thirty percent surtax on consumer interest in excess of fifteen 
percent annually using data from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance.  The burden of this tax falls on the 11.8% 
of households with unpaid balances on credit cards with interest rates over fifteen percent.  The tax is highly 
regressive with a Suits Index of -0.40. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Minnesota Legislature twice passed legislation in 2009 that would create a permanent thirty percent surtax 
on consumer interest in excess of fifteen percent annually.  “Any person or organization who conducts a trade or 
business subject to Federal Regulation Z, and who charges interest on the credit is subject to the surtax.” 1  This 
surtax did not become law because it was vetoed.  
The vast majority of the revenue from this provision is expected to be collected on outstanding credit card 
balances.  This tax would also apply to all other forms of consumer loans with interest rates about the fifteen percent 
threshold, including payday loans and loans at pawnshops.  The Minnesota Department of Revenue estimates that 
this tax would raise $103.2 million in FY 2012 and $109.5 million in FY 2013, while noting “It is possible that some 
[of] the revenue may not be collected because some creditors may lack the necessary connections required by 
Minnesota nexus rules.  Without nexus, taxpayers are not subject to the tax.”2   
Historically, policy changes about credit card regulation in Minnesota have had important national 
implications.  The 1978 Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis Supreme Court decision prohibited states from 
applying their interest rate ceilings to nationally chartered banks in other states.  In the aftermath of Marquette  
credit card issuers located in states, like South Dakota and Delaware, without interest rate ceilings and credit card 
usage increased.  This type of surtax on interest paid from consumer loans may be considered in other states dealing 
with their own budget challenges.   
The tax incidence of this surtax has not been studied because it is a new proposal.  Both legislators and the 
Governor considering this tax were uncertain about its effects.  The Governor expressed concern about the unknown 
effects of this novel tax.  The sponsor of the tax stated, “I don’t know what the consequences are going to be.”3  A 
member of the Minnesota House Tax Committee, Rep. Diana Loffler, asked during the hearing on this proposal, 
“Has this been implemented anywhere else?  Is this poor people who are dependent on those 15 percent loans, who 
are now going to pay 25 percent because we passed this?”4   
                                                          
1
 House File 2323 and House File 885 of the 2009-2010  Minnesota Legislative session as reported from the House-
Senate Conference Committee on Taxes.  The quote is from H.F. 2323’s Bill Summary.  Regulation Z governs 
regulation of consumer credit by the Federal Reserve.  
2 Minnesota Department of Revenue.  Analysis of S.F. 508, As Proposed to be Amended.  
http://taxes.state.mn.us/legal_policy/Documents/revenue_analysis_2009_2010_senate_files_sf0507_hf0716__2.pdf     
3
 Audio recording of March 9, 2009 Minnesota House Tax Committee.  At minute 17.  
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/minutes1ls86.asp?comm=86103&id=1803  
4
 Audio recording of March 9, 2009 Minnesota House Tax Committee.  At minute 16.   
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This surtax is a serious policy proposal since it twice won majority support in the Minnesota legislature.  A 
better understanding of the tax incidence of this surtax on consumer interest would help policymakers and the public 
make more informed decisions about the merits of the proposed surtax.  This note uses data from the 2007 Survey of 
Consumer Finance to estimate the tax incidence of the proposed surtax.   
2. Tax Incidence  
The burden of a tax is not the same as the statutory requirement to remit tax payments to the government.  This 
principle of taxation is taught in every public finance book.  The long-run risk-adjusted after-tax rate of return on 
loans in a small open economy is fixed by the larger national or even world capital markets.  Loans outside of 
Minnesota, to business or government in Minnesota, and below the interest rate threshold are not subject to this 
surtax on consumer loans over fifteen percent.  This results in a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds to 
Minnesota consumers adjusting for risk in the long run.  Creditors do not have to accept lower interest rates on loans 
to Minnesota consumers because the gross interest rate to the consumer can increase.   
The impact of the 30% tax inclusive surtax on interest in excess of 15% is illustrated in Figure 1.  If in the 
absence of the surtax, the annual interest rate would be 22%, the surtax would raise it to 25%.  The 30% surtax 
would then apply to those ten percentage points, leaving the lender with an after-surtax return of 22 percent – the 
same as in the absence of the surtax.  With a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds to Minnesota adjusting for 
risk, the interest rate on loans currently charging more than fifteen percent would increase by 3/7 (or 42.86%) of the 
current interest in excess of fifteen percent.
5
    
3. Data and Results 
The 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data is ideally suited to analyze the tax incidence of this 
proposed 30% tax on interest earned in excess of 15% annually because this dataset contains information on 
household income, household credit card balances, and household credit card interest rates.  The 2007 survey is the 
most recent available data containing the variables necessary to estimate the tax incidence of this surtax.  The 
income measure used is self-reported household 2007 income from all sources.
6
   Annual household tax payments 
                                                          
5 The tax inclusive rate is    , so the tax-exclusive rate is    
  
    
 
 
 
       . 
6
 All values are in 2007 dollars. 
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are calculated as the tax exclusive rate multiplied by the interest rate on the credit card with the largest balance less 
the fifteen percent threshold then multiplied by total self-reported credit card balances.
7
   
The results presented are based on the 2007 survey and could be different if the low interest rate and low 
inflation environment prevailing when the survey was conducted was replaced by higher rates and inflation, such as 
the interest rate environment of the early 1980s.  In 1980 the prime interest rate for banks’ most credit worthy 
customers exceeded 18%.  In that high interest rate environment the fixed nominal fifteen percent threshold for the 
surtax in the Minnesota legislation would result in the surtax further increasing interest rates for all consumer loans 
including home mortgages, auto loans, and fixed term loans.  The combination of this surtax and a high national 
interest rate environment would have significant negative effects on consumers’ ability to finance the purchase of 
durable goods that could negatively affect general economic activity. 
This analysis does not estimate the tax incidence of surtax applied to other consumer loans, such as payday and 
pawnshop loans.  The Minnesota Department of Revenue estimated that these other loans would raise to only ten 
percent as much revenue as the surtax on credit card debt.     
The analysis of the tax incidence of thirty percent surtax on consumer interest payments exceeding fifteen 
percent annually compares the distribution of household income with the distribution of surtax payments borne by 
households.  These results are presented by both income decile and population decile.  Analysis by income decile 
split households into ten groups with an equal amount of household income in each group.  Results by population 
decile split households into ten groups with an equal number of households in each group.  In both cases households 
are ordered by income.   
Figures 2-4 and Table 1 present results by income decile.  The regressivity of the surtax is show in Figure 2, 
which compares household income to tax payments as a percentage of income.  Tax payments as a percent of 
income are highest for households in the lower income deciles.  Tax payments as a percent of income generally 
decline with income.  The tax payments of the three highest income deciles are minuscule compared to their income.  
On average tax payments are 0.0291% of income, but tax payments are 0.0597% of income in the first income 
decile.   
                                                          
7  The SCF reports only the interest rate on the credit card with the largest balance.  That rate is applied to all credit 
card balances.  The SCF is a national survey that does provide state identification in its public use dataset.  
Therefore the national sample is used. 
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Figure 3 shows that a minority of households carry balances on credit cards with interest rates over fifteen 
percent annually.  Only 11.8% of all households have balances on credit cards with interest rates exceeding 15%.  
About 17.5% of households in the 2
nd
 through 4
th
 income deciles have credit card balances at interest rates that are 
subject to the surtax.  Under five percent of households in the three highest income deciles are subject to the surtax.  
Figure 4 shows tax payments as a percent of income for those households subject to the surtax.  Since a small 
percentage of households would be subject to the surtax, the tax burden of those households subject to the surtax as 
a percent of their income is much higher than in Figure 1.  Figure 4 shows that in the first income decile households 
subject to the surtax would pay 0.47% of their income in this tax payment.  Tax payments conditional on positive 
tax liability are generally decreasing with income, with the notable exception of the seventh income decile.  The 
average annual tax payment conditional on being subject to the surtax is $164.07.  The annual revenue potential of 
this surtax is $19.36 per household, which is the product of the conditional annual tax payment and the 11.8% of 
households would bear the burden of the proposed surtax.
8
      
The presentation of results by population decile is an another way to display the same underlying data that 
provides more detail on the tax burden at the lower end of the income distribution.  While income deciles have an 
equal amount of income in each group, population deciles have an equal number of households in each group.  For 
example, the first income decile includes households from the first four population deciles in the 2007 SCF.   
Figures 4-7 and Table 2 present results by population decile.  These results generally look like the results 
presented by income decile, with higher tax burden as a share of income for low and middle income households 
compared to high income households.  Figure 5 shows that tax payments as a percent of income are highest in the 
second population decile, where they are 0.10% of income.  This is the highest surtax burden as a percent of income 
for any income classification.  Figure 6 shows that a higher percentage of households in the middle population 
deciles would be directly affected by the surtax.  Between 16.0% and 18.2% of households in the third through eight 
population decile would be credit card balances at interest rates that would make them subject to the surtax.  Figure 
7 shows that conditional on being subject to the surtax, lower income households would have higher tax payments 
relative to their income.  Households in the second population decile subject to the surtax would pay 1.00% of their 
income in surtax payments.  
                                                          
8
 This assumes that there is sufficient nexus that the taxing state is able to collect all of the tax.   
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The Lorenz Curve is yet another way to display tax incidence results.  A Lorenz Curve graphs the relationship 
between cumulative proportion of income on the horizontal axis versus the cumulative proportion of tax payments 
on the vertical axis.  Households are ordered by income on the horizontal axis of the Lorenz Curve.  The Suits Index 
is a summary statistic of tax incidence based on the Lorenz Curve.  Let L be the area under the Lorenz Curve and K 
be the area under the 45 degree line.  The Suits Index, S, is S =   
 
 
.  A tax is regressive if the Suits Index is 
negative, with lower Suits Indices indicating greater tax regressivity.  This occurs when the Lorenz Curve lies above 
and to the left of the 45 degree line.  When the Lorenz Curve is below and to the right of the 45 degree line, the tax 
is progressive and the Suits Index is positive.    
The Lorenz Curve for the 30% surtax on consumer interest payments over 15% annually is show in Figure 8.  
The Lorenz Curve for the surtax lies well above the 45% degree line, showing the regressivity of the surtax.  The 
lowest income decile pays just over twenty percent of total surtax payments.  The two lowest income deciles pay 
37.2% of total surtax payments.  The five lowest income deciles have 50% of total income yet pay 81.7% of total 
surtax payments.  The two highest income deciles account for 20% of total income and pay only 0.2% of total surtax 
payments. 
The Suits Index for the thirty percent surtax on consumer interest payments is -0.40.  This negative Suits Index 
shows that the proposed surtax would be highly regressive.  Table 3 compares this proposed surtax to some other 
revenue sources in Minnesota.  The proposed surtax would be one of the most regressive taxes in Minnesota.  The 
proposed surtax on consumer interest above a 15% threshold would be more regressive than the state sales tax, state 
corporate income tax, and all Minnesota lottery games.  It would be less regressive than the state cigarette and 
tobacco excise tax. 
The surtax threshold of fifteen percent in the Minnesota legislation is somewhat arbitrary.  There could be 
other thresholds considered for future tax legislation.  Therefore, using the same methodology the Suits Index is 
computed for annual interest thresholds of 12%, 15%, 18%, 21%, 24%, 27%, and 30%.  Changing the 15% annual 
interest rate threshold for the surtax on consumer interest payments changes the tax incidence of the surtax.  Table 4 
reports the Suits Indices as a function of the interest rate threshold between 12% and 30% annually.  Increasing the 
interest rate threshold makes the surtax more regressive as shown by the more negative Suits Indices.  A surtax on 
consumer interest above a 30% threshold would have a Suits Index of  -0.62.  This is a rather remarkably negative 
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value for the Suits Index.  A surtax on consumer interest above thirty percent could be the most regressive tax in 
Minnesota. 
4. Conclusion  
Minnesota’s proposed thirty percent surtax on consumer interest in excess of fifteen percent would create a 
highly regressive tax.  Since the surtax is imposed only when consumers carry balances over fifteen percent, only 
the 11.8% of households with these loans would directly feel the burden of this surtax.  Hopefully, this detailed 
information about the regressive tax incidence of this proposed Minnesota tax will be useful to policymakers 
considering the merits of such legislation in the future.    
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Figure 1: Example of the Effects of a 30% Surtax on Consumer Interest  
Exceeding 15% on the Interest Rate Paid by the Consumer 
 
 
Figure 2: Tax Payments as a Percent of Income for a 30% Surtax on Consumer  
Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Income Decile 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Households Subject to a 30% Surtax on Consumer  
Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Income Decile  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tax Payments of Households as a Percent of Income Conditional on being Taxed for a 30% Surtax 
on Consumer Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Income Decile
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Figure 5: Tax Payments as a Percent of Income for a 30% Surtax on Consumer  
Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Population Decile
 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Households Subject to a 30% Surtax on Consumer 
Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Population Decile 
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Figure 7: Tax Payments of Households as a Percent of Income Conditional on being Taxed for a 30% Surtax 
on Consumer Interest Payments Exceeding 15% by Population Decile 
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Figure 8: Lorenz Curve for 30% Surtax on Consumer Interest Payments Exceeding 15% 
Suits Index = -0.40  
 
 
Table 1: The Distribution of a 30% Surtax on Consumer Interest Over 15% by Income Decile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First 36,000$          & under 20.53% 0.0597% 11.6% 0.47% 103.48$                  
Second 36,000$          55,000$         16.72% 0.0486% 17.4% 0.28% 125.82$                  
Third 55,000$          75,000$         16.59% 0.0483% 17.5% 0.26% 164.91$                  
Fourth 75,000$          97,000$         13.31% 0.0387% 17.6% 0.21% 180.31$                  
Fifth 97,000$          125,000$       14.53% 0.0417% 15.2% 0.25% 269.75$                  
Sixth 125,000$        178,000$       5.24% 0.0152% 10.4% 0.15% 223.20$                  
Seventh 178,000$        310,000$       11.88% 0.0346% 9.3% 0.28% 614.20$                  
Eighth 310,000$        753,000$       0.98% 0.0029% 4.6% 0.05% 212.83$                  
Ninth 753,000$        2,110,000$    0.17% 0.0005% 4.1% 0.01% 78.19$                    
Tenth 2,110,000$     & over 0.04% 0.0001% 2.9% 0.00% 101.13$                  
Entire Sample 0.0291% 11.8% 0.23% 164.07$                  
Tax Payments as a 
Percent of Income 
Conditional on Being 
Subject to Surtax
Average Tax 
Payments 
Conditional on 
Being Subject to 
SurtaxIncome Decile Income Range
Percentage of All 
Surtax Tax 
Payments
Surtax Payments 
as a Percent of 
Income
Percentage of 
Households 
Subject to Tax
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Table 2: The Distribution of a 30% Surtax on Consumer Interest Over 15% by Population Decile  
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Suits Indices for Annual Tax Incidence 
Revenue Source Suits Index Source 
Minnesota individual income tax 0.21 2009 Minnesota Tax Incidence Study (2006 full-sample value) 
Powerball - Minnesota Lottery -0.14 Combs, Kim, and Spry (2008) 
Minnesota corporate income tax -0.20 2009 Minnesota Tax Incidence Study (2006 full-sample value) 
Daily 3 - Minnesota Lottery -0.20 Combs, Kim, and Spry (2008) 
Minnesota sales tax -0.20 2009 Minnesota Tax Incidence Study (2006 full-sample value) 
Scratch Games - Minnesota Lottery -0.28 Combs, Kim, and Spry (2008) 
Surtax on Consumer Interest over 15% -0.40 
 Minnesota cigarette and tobacco excise tax -0.59 2009 Minnesota Tax Incidence Study (2006 full-sample value) 
 
 
Table 4: Suits Index for 30% Surcharge on Consumer Interest  
As a Function of the Surcharge Interest Rate Threshold 
 
 
First 12,000$          & under 2.68% 0.0749% 8.0% 0.77% 75.35$                    
Second 12,000$          20,000$         6.52% 0.0971% 10.0% 0.96% 148.20$                  
Third 20,000$          27,000$         5.90% 0.0595% 12.0% 0.51% 121.15$                  
Fourth 27,000$          35,000$         5.25% 0.0399% 16.0% 0.26% 79.44$                    
Fifth 35,000$          45,000$         7.02% 0.0415% 16.1% 0.24% 97.40$                    
Sixth 45,000$          57,000$         11.16% 0.0517% 18.6% 0.29% 148.46$                  
Seventh 57,000$          72,000$         14.71% 0.0539% 17.5% 0.28% 183.38$                  
Eighth 72,000$          95,000$         13.34% 0.0381% 18.2% 0.20% 165.17$                  
Ninth 95,000$          135,000$       15.28% 0.0323% 13.6% 0.22% 242.72$                  
Tenth 135,000$        & over 18.12% 0.0112% 2.8% 0.14% 413.56$                  
Entire Sample 0.0291% 11.8% 0.23% 164.07$                  
Average Tax 
Payments 
Conditional on 
Being Subject to 
Surtax
Population 
Decile Income Range
Percentage of All 
Surtax Tax 
Payments
Surtax Payments 
as a Percent of 
Income
Percentage of 
Households 
Subject to Tax
Tax Payments as a 
Percent of Income 
Conditional on Being 
Subject to Surtax
Interest Rate 
Threshold
Suits 
Index
12% -0.39
15% -0.40
18% -0.41
21% -0.42
24% -0.51
27% -0.58
30% -0.62
